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care facility’s tax-exempt status should be conditioned upon its adherence to 
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INTRODUCTION 
The latter part of the 20th century saw significant developments in the 
fields of health law and bioethics in the United States when advances in 
artificial respiration, circulation, nutrition, and hydration made it possible 
to maintain biological life well beyond the natural ability of the human 
body.2 These life-sustaining clinical interventions gave rise to solemn 
questions in law and bioethics not only about the scope of a patient’s right 
to refuse such measures, but also about the corresponding extent of a 
physician’s obligation to provide them.3 
A fairly consistent body of jurisprudence, statutory schemes, and 
pronouncements of professional ethics has mostly resolved these 
questions—all of which acknowledge in general terms the fundamental 
nature of one’s right to accept or refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. 
Although the jurisprudence reflects a diversity of thought in terms of legal 
theory, courts have demonstrated a consistent appreciation for the same 
moral and ethical concerns that have guided the medical profession and 
the various state legislatures in their efforts to balance appropriately the 
competing interests of the individual in the exercise of autonomy and the 
state in the preservation of life.4 
                                                                                                             
 2. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 328 (1990); 
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New 
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
 3. See generally ALAN MEISEL & KATHY CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: 
THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING § 2.01 (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2008). 
 4. Although the early cases arose in the context of religious liberty under the 
First Amendment, the later cases focused on the common law concept of informed 
consent to medical treatment and the corollary right not to consent, as well as the 
rights to privacy and liberty grounded in the Constitution. See, e.g., Union Pac. 
Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891); Superintendent of Belchertown St. Sch. 
v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 
1985); In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1989); Jacobson v. 




Questions in early cases concerning patient autonomy in the context of 
end-of-life decision-making focused only on the scope of one’s right to 
refuse life-sustaining treatment.5 In contrast with this traditionally negative 
focus, the contemporary formulation of the query goes further by asking 
whether, or under what circumstances, the law would accommodate the 
positive right of a patient not only to refuse treatment in the form of artificial 
nutrition and hydration, but also to be rendered unconscious and maintained 
in that state without sustenance until death ensues. This question can present 
itself in a variety of clinical situations: 
A patient in the advanced stages of lung cancer requests morphine and 
other sedatives in doses that increase proportionately as the intensity of 
his distress deepens with the progression of the disease. Expecting to 
eventually receive sedatives in doses that render him permanently 
unconscious, the patient asks that nutrition and hydration are withheld 
when he becomes unable to ingest food and fluids on his own. 
 
A patient who suffers from esophageal cancer declines further 
treatment in the form of artificial nutrition and hydration when the 
disease progresses to the point that he can no longer swallow. He also 
asks to be sedated immediately to unconsciousness to relieve the 
suffering that eventually will accompany the absence of food and 
fluids, with death by dehydration to be expected within a few days. 
 
A patient who suffers intractable and interminable pain as a result 
of rheumatoid arthritis has asked to be sedated immediately to 
unconsciousness to relieve her suffering. Although the disease 
process does not impair her natural ability to receive food and 
fluids, she requests that artificial nutrition and hydration are 
withheld until she dies. 
 
A patient who survived numerous bouts of cancer while raising her 
children to adulthood is now in remission. Although she is able to 
ingest food and fluids naturally on her own, she is fearful that her 
cancer will return and asks to be sedated to unconsciousness and then 
be allowed to die by the withholding of artificial nutrition and 
hydration. 
                                                                                                             
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24–30 (1905); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 
221–22 (1990); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980); In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. 
& C.2d 619 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1973); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). 
 5. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 4. 




Although the rights of patients and the authority of physicians in such 
cases have been the subject of meaningful discourse among commentators 
in the disciplines of health policy and bioethics,6 Louisiana law has not 
addressed these issues. In particular, there is a dearth of commentary with 
respect to this issue in the context of the Louisiana Natural Death Act (the 
“Natural Death Act,” or the “Act”) even though the statute would both 
inform and enrich that discussion.7 
This silence is not necessarily surprising because many of these 
procedures occur in the complexities of the clinical setting, in which the 
untrained observer might not readily identify them. In fact, these 
procedures may have sometimes been undertaken in silence either to 
mitigate the emotional consequences borne by the patient’s family or to 
avoid the perplexing legal issues they inevitably present. Notwithstanding 
this somewhat silent history, these measures have increasingly become the 
subject of discussion in recent mainstream media articles.8 Moreover, the 
use of palliative sedation may become more common in the future as our 
population ages and economic concerns over the cost of health care 
continue to grow. In light of this possibility, citizens should carefully 
consider the legal implications of these ethically problematic interventions 
before encountering them on a larger scale. This Article is intended to 
initiate that discussion in the specific context of the Natural Death Act. 
I. DEFINING PALLIATIVE SEDATION: CLINICAL METHODS AND RELATED 
LEGAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The term “palliative sedation”9 refers to the use of sedatives as a 
method of relieving intractable pain and other distressing physical 
                                                                                                             
 6. See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, §§ 7.01–15. 
 7. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 40:1151–1151.9 (2016).  
 8. See, e.g., Michael Ollove, Assisted Suicide is controversial, but palliative 





 9. The practice is also referred to as “terminal sedation,” “deep sedation,” 
“sedation for intractable distress in [the] dying [patient],” “total sedation,” “slow 
euthanasia,” and “sedation to unconsciousness.” See, e.g., Mark A. Levine, Sedation 
to Unconsciousness in End-of-Life Care, CEJA REPORT 5-A-08 (2008), https:// 
journalofethics.ama-assn.org/sites/journalofethics.ama-assn.org/files/2018-05/coet 
1-1305.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7PB-YFK2]; Sef Gevers, Terminal Sedation: A 
Legal Approach, 10 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 359, 360 (2003); Robert J. Kingsberry & 
Howard M. Ducharme, Two Perspectives on Total/Terminal/Palliative Sedation, 




symptoms that tend to accompany the latter stages of a terminal illness.10 
The process generally involves the administration of a sedative in 
progressively increasing doses to relieve suffering, even to the point of 
eventually rendering the patient unconscious with the understanding that 
he would be maintained in that state until death. It is common to withhold 
food and fluids in such cases, and death tends to occur within several days. 
A. The Relationship Between Palliative Sedation, Assisted Suicide, and 
Euthanasia  
Because palliative sedation involves an affirmative intervention that 
leads to the same result as assisted suicide and euthanasia, it is sometimes 
difficult to draw a meaningful distinction between these practices. The 
distinction is particularly difficult to make when the sedation is 
accompanied by the withholding of nutrition and hydration. It is thus a 
challenge to place this palliative intervention on the continuum of end-of-
life treatment alternatives other than to say in general terms that it falls 
somewhere between the widely accepted “passive” withholding or 
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment and the more controversial 
“active” interventions of assisted suicide and euthanasia. Nevertheless, 
commentators widely perceive palliative sedation as an essential element 
of the right to refuse treatment at the end of life.11  
One factor that may distinguish palliative sedation from assisted 
suicide and euthanasia is the absence of any direct causal or chronological 
relationship between the act of sedation and the patient’s death.12 Palliative 
                                                                                                             
CTR. FOR BIOETHICS & HUMAN DIGNITY (2002), http://www.cbhd.org/resources/ 
endoflife/kingsberry-ducharme_2002-01-24.html [https://perma.cc/J8KF-BUYS]. 
 10. These symptoms can include anxiety, agitated depression, insomnia, and 
vomiting. See, e.g., Dieter Birnbacher, Terminal Sedation, Euthanasia and Causal 
Roles, MEDSCAPE GEN. MED. (May 31, 2007), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov 
/pmc/articles/PMC1994875/ [https://perma.cc/55DU-YZR6].  
 11. One author described the relationship between palliative sedation and the 
right to refuse treatment in this manner: “The right to refuse treatment and the 
availability of palliative [sedation] are inextricably intertwined. The attempt to 
think about one without thinking about the other is a formula for making bad law 
and bad policy, and for increasing human suffering.” Stephen Arons, Palliative 
Care in the U.S. Healthcare System: Constitutional Right or Criminal Act, 29 W. 
N. ENG. L. REV. 309, 311 (2007). 
 12. Because palliative sedation leads to the same end as assisted suicide and 
euthanasia, some commentators have argued that they cannot logically or ethically 
be distinguished. See the discussion at notes 29–33, infra, and accompanying text. 
Despite the blurring of these procedures in the eyes of many observers on both 
sides of the autonomy spectrum, evidence tends to suggest that physicians prefer 




sedation involves only the administration of a sedative as a means to 
relieve suffering, and it does not itself induce or necessarily accelerate the 
moment of death.13 This is true whether the sedative is administered only 
proportionately in conformity with the degree of suffering or rapidly to 
render the patient unresponsive with all possible haste. Perhaps because 
palliative sedation differs from both assisted suicide and euthanasia in 
terms of its immediate consequence, commentators perceive it as an 
appropriate means of last resort to relieve a patient’s suffering as death 
becomes imminent.14 Assisted suicide and euthanasia both have the 
immediate and intended effect of causing death. Physician-assisted suicide 
involves the prescription of a barbiturate in a dosage intended to terminate 
the patient’s life when he ingests it by his own hand.15 Euthanasia, on the 
other hand, entails one person’s affirmative act to bring about the death of 
another—such as by administering the same lethal concoction the patient 
might use in assisted suicide.16 For practical purposes, therefore, palliative 
sedation differs from both assisted suicide and euthanasia in terms of 
immediate effect; assisted suicide and euthanasia produce the same effect 
but differ in terms of the actor’s identity.17 
                                                                                                             
palliative sedation to assisted suicide. See, e.g., Studies reveal physicians’ 
attitudes on end-of-life care, U. IOWA (Dec. 6, 2004), https://www.eurekalert.org/ 
pub_releases/2004-12/uoi-srp120304.php [https://perma.cc/B7XA-GGZ2]. 
 13. See Gevers, supra note 9, at 361. As noted in the discussion at note 27, 
infra, and accompanying text, however, the maintenance of a patient in a deeply 
sedated state for an extended period of time poses its own complications that may 
hasten death. 
 14. These procedures tend to be employed only after less intensive palliative 
options have been exhausted. The prevalence of palliative sedation as a means of 
providing relief to terminally ill patients has been estimated to fall within the 
range of 21% to 54.5%, and it has been suggested that the average time from 
sedation to death runs between two and four days. See Rob McStay, Terminal 
Sedation: Palliative Care for Intractable Pain Post Glucksberg and Quill, 29 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 45, 46 (2003). 
 15. See, e.g., Parker & Paine, supra note 1, at 125. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Dr. Jack Kevorkian, for example, initially helped terminally ill persons 
bring about their own deaths and later progressed to administering the fatal 
injection himself, thus crossing the line from assisted suicide to euthanasia and 
leading to his conviction of second-degree murder. See Dirk Johnson, Kevorkian 
Sentenced to 10 to 25 years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 1999), https://w 
ww.nytimes.com/1999/04/14/us/kevorkian-sentenced-to-10-to-25-years-in-prison  
.html [https://perma.cc/H8Z7-HBPU].  




B. Forms of Palliative Sedation in the Clinical Setting 
The practice of palliative sedation in the contemporary clinical setting 
manifests itself in two primary expressions: “proportionate palliative 
sedation,” commonly referred to simply as “proportionate sedation,” and 
“palliative sedation to unconsciousness,” or “sedation to unconsciousness.” 
Proportionate sedation is the most prevalent form of these two 
interventions.18 
Proportionate sedation involves the progressive administration of the 
minimum amount of sedative necessary to relieve the patient’s suffering 
as it intensifies with the progression of the patient’s disease.19 For 
example, physicians commonly administer morphine and other sedatives 
to lung cancer patients who are in the terminal stages of their disease in 
doses that proportionally increase with the intensity of the patients’ 
distress typically in the form of pain, dyspnea, and anxiety.20 Although 
physicians employ proportionate sedation with the understanding that the 
progressive increase in sedatives will eventually render the patient 
unconscious or hasten death by hours or days, the practice does not 
purpose either of those consequences; rather, these results merely 
correspond with the relief of suffering at the margin of either 
unconsciousness or death.21 For this reason, proportionate sedation is 
generally considered to be an acceptable intervention from an ethical 
perspective. 
This ethical view is grounded in a fundamental principle of bioethics 
known as the rule of double effect, sometimes called the “doctrine of 
double effect” or the “principle of double effect.”22 According to the 
principle of double effect, it is morally acceptable to engage in an 
affirmative act that one might expect to cause harm, but only if that harm 
is an unavoidable consequence of an attempt to achieve an identifiable 
good.23 The doctrine of double effect serves as an exception to the broader 
                                                                                                             
 18. For purposes of this Article, both proportionate palliative sedation and 
palliative sedation to unconsciousness are referred to as “palliative sedation.”  
 19. Parker & Paine, supra note 1, at 123–24. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL 
ETHICS 206 (4th ed. 1994).  
 23. Id. The classical formulation of the rule requires that all four of the 
following elements be satisfied in order for an action to be morally permissible: 
(1) The act must be good, or at least morally neutral (independent of its 
consequences)[;] 




bioethics principle of non-maleficence, which holds that a physician must 
not intentionally inflict harm.24 
The principle of double effect is now widely employed to justify the 
use of intense doses of narcotics and sedatives as a palliative measure to 
relieve suffering at the end of life, but it came from the Roman Catholic 
tradition of defining the circumstances under which therapeutic abortions 
may be morally appropriate.25 For example, it might sometimes be 
necessary to treat a pregnant woman’s cancer of the cervix by performing 
a hysterectomy, or to remove the fallopian tube from a woman who has an 
ectopic pregnancy to prevent a fatal hemorrhage.26 In each of these cases, 
a physician employs a legitimate medical procedure to save the mother’s 
life even though it will inevitably claim the life of the fetus. 
Notwithstanding the certainty of that cause and effect, the doctrine of 
double effect would justify these procedures from a moral perspective so 
long as the physician’s intent was not the fetus’s death. Stated another 
way, the physician whose actions caused the fetus’s death would not be 
considered to have violated the principle of non-maleficence if: (1) his sole 
purpose was to save the life of the mother; and (2) the death of the fetus 
                                                                                                             
(2) [t]he agent intends only the good effect of the act. The bad effect can 
be foreseen, tolerated and permitted, but it must not be intended[;] 
(3) [t]he bad effect must not be a means to the good effect. If the good 
effect were the direct causal result of the bad effect, the agent would 
intend the bad effect in pursuit of the good effect[; and] 
(4) [t]he good effect must outweigh the bad effect. The bad effect is 
permissible only if a proportionate reason is present that compensates for 
permitting the foreseen bad effect.  
Id. at 207 (subheadings omitted). 
The mere legality of one’s decision under state law is not sufficient to invoke 
the principle of double effect. Rather, the rule would accommodate the 
combination of sedation and another lawful act or omission, such as withholding 
nutrition and hydration, only if the sedation does not achieve its palliative 
objective by causing death—a fundamental requirement of the double effect 
doctrine. Thus, the doctrine would apply when sedation to unconsciousness is 
combined with the withholding of artificial nutrition and hydration only if 
sedatives are employed to render the patient unconscious, but no further. It is this 
distinction that denies ethical justification for physician-assisted suicide, even in 
states in which that intervention is lawful. 
 24. Id.  
 25. See, e.g., Parker & Paine, supra note 1, at 124. 
 26. Id. 




was merely the unintended, although foreseen and inevitable, result of the 
physician’s legitimate purpose.27 
The same logic justifies the use of powerful sedatives as a palliative 
measure when death is near, at least when a physician administers 
sedatives in a manner that proportionally correlates the increase in doses 
with the patient’s level of distress. Although these interventions may 
eventually render the patient unconscious and even hasten the moment of 
death—because of the risk of infection that tends to accompany a 
prolonged period of sedation—the realms of both bioethics and law accept 
that the physician’s singular intent in employing them is to relieve 
suffering, even though the means of achieving that goal will cause a 
correlative harm. Grounded in the principle of double effect, proportionate 
sedation has gained wide acceptance within the medical profession as an 
appropriate way to address a patient’s intractable pain and distress during 
the dying process, and these interventions are commonly employed for the 
purpose of pain relief.28 
Although a patient may be rendered unconscious at some point during 
the course of administering proportionate sedation, a physician employs 
the intervention known as “sedation to unconsciousness” with the specific 
intent of immediately rendering the patient unresponsive and then 
maintaining him in an unconscious state until death.29 Because most 
candidates for sedation to unconsciousness are unlikely to have any desire 
to eat or drink by the time this intervention is considered, it tends not to be 
accompanied by the administration of artificial nutrition and hydration.30  
                                                                                                             
 27. In its classical expression, the doctrine of double effect would not apply 
to every abortion that may be necessary to save the mother’s life. For example, a 
woman who has serious heart disease might face a significant risk of death unless 
her pregnancy is terminated. An abortion in that case, however, would not satisfy 
all four elements of the doctrine of double effect because the action of killing the 
fetus—the bad effect—would serve as the means to save the mother’s life—the 
good effect. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 22, at 207–08. 
 28. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 9; Gevers, supra note 9. 
 29. See, e.g., Mark F. Carr & Gina Jervey Mohr, Palliative Sedation as Part 
of a Continuum of Palliative Care, 11. J. PALLIATIVE MED. 76, 76 (2008); 
Timothy E. Quill et al., Last Resort Options for Palliative Sedation, 151 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 421 (2009). A third form of sedation, which Quill et al. identified 
as “ordinary sedation,” is employed both within and outside of the palliative care 
context and provides relief from symptoms without impairing the patient’s level 
of consciousness. Id. 
 30. See Quill et al., supra note 29, at 422 (“Except under very unusual 
circumstances, artificial hydration and nutrition are not provided.”); Gevers, 
supra note 9, at 361 (“Terminal patients are not eating or drinking substantial 
amounts; the patients that are considered for deep sedation [sedation to 




Sedation to unconsciousness is more controversial and less common 
than its proportionate counterpart, primarily because of the complex 
blurring of intent created when a physician purposefully renders the 
patient unable to receive nutrition and hydration naturally and then orders 
that food and fluids be withheld.31 Focusing on the intentional, pre-planned 
coupling of sedation with the withholding of nutrition and hydration, some 
observers have concluded that sedation to unconsciousness is more closely 
identified with euthanasia than palliative care.32 
The argument that sedation to unconsciousness is akin to euthanasia 
is most compelling when the patient’s ability to receive food and fluids 
has not been compromised. In one case, for example, a former cancer 
patient who was fully able to eat and drink expressed a desire to be sedated 
to unconsciousness and then forego the administration of artificial 
nutrition and hydration. Although thought to be in remission at the time of 
                                                                                                             
unconsciousness] are not likely to eat and will hardly drink. Although artificial 
hydration and nutrition would seem indicated when the patient is no longer able 
to eat and drink himself, in some patients—in particular those already dying—it 
will be contraindicated because it would only lengthen the dying process. In 
others—apart from the risk of pulmonary edema and other adverse effects—it 
may be withheld either on the basis of an explicit refusal of the patient, or because 
in the final analysis the patient—taking into account his intolerable situation and 
the inevitability of an imminent death—has nothing to gain from it.”); Carr & 
Mohr, supra note 29, at 79 (suggesting that artificial nutrition and hydration are 
neither palliatively nor medically indicated for patients at the terminal stages of 
their disease process because they “often feel no hunger and may be unable to 
utilize nutrients as a healthy body would”). 
 31. See, e.g., Parker & Paine, supra note 1, at 123–24. 
 32. See McStay, supra note 14. Those who challenge the propriety of 
palliative sedation to unconsciousness draw from legal notions of causation and 
intent to deny any meaningful distinction between that intervention and 
euthanasia, simply because death is equally certain with either measure. As one 
commentator noted: 
While similar to palliative measures as far as the sedation itself is 
concerned, withholding of hydration and nutrition brings terminal 
sedation into the realm of non treatment decisions. At the same time, to 
the extent that the combination of these two measures may shorten the 
patient’s life, the practice may be easily associated with euthanasia. It is 
no surprise, therefore, that terminal sedation has been called . . . “slow 
euthanasia” or “backdoor euthanasia,” suggesting that it should be 
dismissed as a covert form of practice which is by many already 
considered as unacceptable per se. 
Gevers, supra note 9, at 360. See also David Orentlicher, The Supreme Court and 
Terminal Sedation: Rejecting Assisted Suicide, Embracing Euthanasia, 24 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 947 (1997). 




her request, she had undergone treatment for several recurring bouts of 
cancer throughout her life and was fearful that the cancer would return. 
Having fulfilled the responsibility of raising her children and desiring to 
avoid the discomfort she had experienced during the prior incidents of 
illness, she decided that she would rather die than live with the fear of 
another episode of cancer. She eventually located a facility that 
accommodated her wishes.33 
Whatever reasoning the facility used to justify its acquiescence to this 
woman’s request, it was not grounded in the principle of double effect. To 
the contrary, the facts of the case suggest strongly that a physician 
employed the sedatives in a contrived but thinly veiled effort to provide a 
comfortable death without appearing to cross the line from the passive 
refusal of treatment to an active intervention logically indistinguishable 
from euthanasia. 
Not all such cases so closely mirror the practice of euthanasia. 
Therefore, it would be premature to universally dismiss the rule of double 
effect as a meaningful tool for evaluating all cases in which sedation to 
unconsciousness is accompanied by the withholding of artificial nutrition 
and hydration. 
The euthanasia analogy loses its force altogether when a pre-existing 
medical condition drives the patient’s need for artificially delivered 
nutrition and hydration. Consider, for example, a patient who suffers from 
esophageal cancer. Such a patient might refuse artificial nutrition and 
hydration when he becomes unable to swallow and then ask to be sedated 
to unconsciousness to relieve the suffering that accompanies the absence 
of food and fluids, with death by dehydration to be expected within a few 
days. A patient’s decision to withhold nutrition and hydration in such a 
case should be considered independently of the fact that he would require 
deep sedation to mitigate the suffering that will follow. Under this view, it 
would be logical to view the act of sedation and the patient’s refusal of 
treatment as separate and unique events, and to attribute death to the 
underlying medical condition that precipitated the need for artificially 
delivered sustenance. 
The key factor that justifies the conclusion that the underlying medical 
condition caused death is the absence of any proximate causal relationship 
between the act of sedation and the patient’s death. Since the patient’s need 
for sedation as a palliative measure would arise from his irreversible 
inability to swallow, and since that inability would exist without regard to 
his state of consciousness—reflecting merely the natural progression of 
                                                                                                             
 33. The author became aware of this case during a personal conversation with 
the bioethicist whom the facility consulted after the event. 




the disease—no relationship exists between the act of sedation and the 
patient’s death. In the absence of that link, there would be no basis on 
which to conclude that the physician undertook the act of sedation with 
any intent other than palliation, and the doctrine of double effect would 
negate the euthanasia analogy. 
One cannot rely on this reasoning in all cases, however, to alleviate 
concerns about the use of sedation to unconsciousness as a disguised 
method of euthanasia. Assume, for example, that a patient who suffers 
intractable pain as a result of rheumatoid arthritis requests that he is 
sedated immediately to unconsciousness and that food and fluids 
thereafter are withheld. By simultaneously creating and failing to satisfy 
the patient’s need for the artificial delivery of nutrition and hydration, this 
application of palliative sedation would on its face appear to reflect a 
subtle form of euthanasia.34 
                                                                                                             
 34. Legal principles of causation would suggest that death was intended in a 
case such as this, thus exposing the physician to criminal liability for homicide. 
Although prosecution may be unlikely, as a practical matter this risk would exist 
even in states in which assisted suicide is lawful. The risk exists because, in 
assisted suicide, the patient would administer the death-inducing agent. 
Euthanasia, on the other hand, is directly brought about at the physician’s hand. 
In light of this distinction, the law may consider physician-assisted suicide more 
as a form of suicide with the indirect assistance of a physician rather than as a 
homicide directly at his hand. 
One might anticipate an argument grounded in the doctrine of double effect 
that would purport to distinguish this situation from euthanasia if the sedative is 
administered at the minimum dosage necessary to relieve suffering. In effect, this 
argument would correlate proportionate sedation with sedation to 
unconsciousness when the sedative is applied at the margin of unconsciousness. 
Under this view, the patient’s simultaneous loss of both consciousness and the 
ability to ingest nutrition and hydration would be merely foreseeable but 
unintended consequences of administering the sedative—the sole intent of which 
was to relieve suffering. Considered in the double effect context, the bad effects 
of the sedative, rendering the patient unable to ingest food and fluids, would be 
not the means of achieving the intended good effect of relief from suffering, but 
as the inevitable though unintended consequence of it. Those who would deny the 
identity between sedation to unconsciousness and euthanasia in such a case may 
also focus on the fact that, unlike cases of assisted suicide and euthanasia, the act 
of sedating the patient to relieve suffering would not, of itself, result in her 
immediate death, whether the sedative is administered proportionally, in 
increments, or immediately, with a single dose. See Gevers, supra note 9, at 361. 
The ethical basis for this distinction has been the subject of considerable 
discussion among moral philosophers, lawyers and practicing physicians. See, 
e.g., Levine, supra note 9. The maintenance of a patient in a deeply sedated state 
for an extended period of time, however, poses its own complications that might 




C. Palliative Sedation and Professional Medical Standards 
 
The medical profession widely views the practice of palliative 
sedation as an appropriate means of last resort to relieve suffering, at least 
when the physician administers the sedative in a manner that denies any 
direct causal relationship or chronological identity with the patient’s 
death.35 Despite the occasional blurring of the procedures involved, 
evidence suggests that physicians prefer palliative sedation to assisted 
suicide—and, by implication, to euthanasia.36 Moreover, courts tend to 
consider decisions concerning the provision of palliative care to be 
primarily a matter of medical judgment and professional discretion.37  
The American Medical Association (“AMA”) responded to this 
judicial deference in 2008 by adopting general clinical policies and 
professional guidelines to address the ethical dilemmas extreme palliative 
interventions such as sedation to unconsciousness pose.38 These 
professional standards limit the provision of palliative sedation to 
circumstances of unrelieved, severe physical suffering of patients who are 
imminently dying and whose clinical symptoms have been unresponsive 
to other aggressive treatment geared to symptom relief. The AMA 
guidelines also recognize that extreme palliative interventions should be 
employed only: (1) as a last resort; (2) with the sole intent to relieve 
                                                                                                             
hasten death. This fact is true whether the sedative is administered proportionately 
with the degree of suffering, or rapidly in order to render the patient insensate and 
unresponsive with all possible haste. 
 35. Gevers, supra note 9, at 361. 
 36. See, e.g., Studies reveal physicians’ attitudes on end-of-life care, supra note 
12, and statistical evidence reported therein. According to Lauris Kaldjian, NMD, 
the lead investigator in the studies cited in this article, physician attitudes appear to 
be related to their experience in caring for terminally ill patients and the frequency 
with which they attend religious services: “[T]hose who had cared for a greater 
number of terminally [ill] patients in the preceding year were more opposed to 
assisted suicide and also more supportive of terminal sedation . . . , [and among 
those physicians] [t]here seemed to be both a greater willingness to be rigorous in 
end-of-life care but also less willingness to cross that line into actually intending 
death.” Id. See also Levine, supra note 9, and references cited therein. 
 37. See, e.g., Gevers, supra note 9, at 366 (“What is needed is not so much 
specific legislation, but authoritative clinical guidelines providing a workable 
protocol on how physicians should proceed.”). 
 38. See, e.g., CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, Principles of Medical Ethics §§ I, 
VII (AM. MED. ASS’N 2001); Levine, supra note 9. 




suffering rather than to cause or hasten death; and (3) in a manner that does 
not directly cause death.39  
For all practical purposes, the AMA standards incorporate the ethics-
based rule of double effect. The standards also reflect the manner in which 
the law has traditionally balanced the patient’s interest in self-
determination and the state’s interest in preserving life. Finally, as borne 
out in the following discussion, the AMA guidelines weigh these 
competing interests in much the same way as does the Natural Death Act, 
creating an effective symmetry between these ethical standards and 
Louisiana law.40 The Natural Death Act also implicitly reflects the manner 
in which the courts have weighed these interests in the constitutional 
context. 
II. THE STATUS OF SEDATION TO UNCONSCIOUSNESS AS A MATTER OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
By definition, sedation to unconsciousness arises in the context of 
treatment at the end of life. It entails not only the withholding of artificial 
nutrition and hydration, but also subjecting the patient to deep sedation to 
relieve the distress expected to follow the absence of food and fluids. This 
integration of passive and active steps suggests that the same body of law 
that relates to one’s “negative” right to refuse medical treatment and one’s 
“positive” right to a physician’s assistance in bringing about his death 
should inform the legal implications of sedating a patient to 
unconsciousness. 
A. The “Negative” Right of a Terminally Ill Patient to Withhold or 
Withdraw Life-Sustaining Treatment 
The body of constitutional jurisprudence concerning the refusal of 
medical treatment in the United States originated in 1891, when the 
Supreme Court first addressed the sanctity of one’s right to control his own 
body in the health care context. Holding that a plaintiff in a personal injury 
                                                                                                             
 39. In addition, the AMA guidelines recommend that: (1) the patient or an 
authorized surrogate provide an explicit informed consent to the use of an extreme 
palliative intervention; (2) reasonable steps be taken to ensure that physicians are 
educated about the proper clinical context for their use; (3) physicians consult 
with an interdisciplinary team that includes an expert in palliative care before 
recommending their use to ensure that it is the most appropriate course of 
treatment; and (4) health care facilities establish an internal mechanism to review 
all cases in which patients request these measures. Levine, supra note 9. 
 40. See the discussion infra at notes 111–47 and accompanying text. 




case cannot be compelled to undergo a pretrial medical examination 
without consent, the Court stated: 
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the 
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession 
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference 
of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.41  
Implicit in this notion of bodily integrity is the concept that a patient has 
the right to refuse medical treatment.42 
Although courts have cited different premises as the theoretical basis 
for the right to refuse medical treatment, courts have come to apply this 
right even when the patient’s refusal of treatment is reasonably expected 
to result in death: 
Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going 
self determination. It follows that each man is considered to be 
master of his own body, and he may, if he be of sound mind, 
expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery, or other 
medical treatment. A doctor might well believe that an operation 
or form of treatment is desirable or necessary but the law does not 
permit him to substitute his own judgment for that of the patient 
by any form of artifice or deception.43 
Courts throughout the United States thus readily acknowledge that a 
competent person possesses what one might broadly describe as the right 
to refuse medical treatment, and courts are willing to recognize this right 
                                                                                                             
 41. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
 42. See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914), 
overruled in part by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957). Justice Cardozo 
described the doctrine of informed consent in these terms: “Every human being 
of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with 
his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s 
consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.” Id. at 93. See also 
MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 2.06[A] (“The right to refuse medical 
treatment is a corollary of the requirement of consent to medical treatment and 
has always been implicit in it.”). 
 43. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960). Although many of 
the early cases arose in the context of competent patients who refused treatment 
either on religious grounds or simply as a matter of personal preference, the modern 
so-called “right to die” cases corresponded with the emergence of advanced medical 
technology that enabled physicians to sustain life by employing a combination of 
devices for artificial respiration, circulation, feeding, and hydration. See, e.g., 
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990). 




unconstrained by the fact that the refusal will result in an otherwise 
avoidable death.44  
The Supreme Court first addressed this question in Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Department of Health45 in the context of withdrawing artificial 
nutrition and hydration from a patient in a persistent vegetative state. After 
being ejected from her car in an accident, Nancy Cruzan was discovered 
lying face down in a ditch, unconscious and without any detectable cardiac 
or respiratory function. Paramedics were able to restore her heartbeat and 
breathing prior to transporting her to the hospital, but Nancy remained in 
a coma for approximately three weeks before progressing to a vegetative 
state in which she exhibited no evidence of significant cognitive function. 
Although she was able to receive some amount of nutrition orally, her 
physicians surgically implanted a gastronomy tube to better provide 
nutrition and hydration. Nancy’s physicians were of the opinion that this 
procedure would enable her to live for another 30 years, but only in a 
persistent vegetative state. 
In light of this prognosis, and believing that Nancy would have refused 
artificial nutrition and hydration if she were capable of speaking for 
herself, her parents requested that the physicians remove the gastronomy 
tube and allow her to die.46 Nancy’s parents sought judicial authorization 
to withdraw treatment when the hospital refused to honor their request 
without court approval.  
Although the trial court authorized the hospital to withdraw 
treatment,47 the Missouri Supreme Court reversed by a divided vote. The 
Court acknowledged that one’s right to refuse treatment was implicit in 
the common law doctrine of informed consent, but it expressed skepticism 
about the application of that doctrine under the specific facts of Nancy’s 
                                                                                                             
 44. See, e.g., MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, and cases cited therein. 
See also Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 328. 
 45. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261. In re Quinlan was the seminal decision in the 
U.S. concerning the refusal of life-sustaining treatment. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 
647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).  
 46. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 267.  
 47. The trial court found that a person in Nancy’s condition had a 
fundamental right under the Missouri and U.S. Constitutions to refuse or direct 
the withdrawal of “death-prolonging procedures.” Id. at 261. The court also 
found:  
Nancy’s “expressed thoughts at age twenty-five in somewhat serious 
conversation with a housemate friend that if sick or injured she would 
not wish to continue her life unless she could live at least halfway 
normally suggests that given her present condition she would not wish 
to continue on with her nutrition and hydration.”  
Id. at 268 (citation omitted). 




case.48 The Court also expressed doubt as to whether such a right existed 
under the U.S. Constitution,49 and it was unwilling to construe the 
Missouri Constitution as embodying a right of privacy that would “support 
the right of a person to refuse medical treatment in every circumstance.”50 
Finally, noting that Missouri’s living will statute embodied a policy that 
strongly favored the preservation of life,51 the Court held that “no person 
can assume that choice for an incompetent in the absence of the formalities 
required under [the living will statute] or the clear and convincing, 
inherently reliable evidence absent here.”52 The Missouri Supreme Court 
thus reversed the decision of the trial court on the grounds that the record 
did not reflect sufficient evidence to indicate that Nancy would have 
wanted treatment to be withdrawn.53 
The U.S. Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari to consider the 
question of whether the U.S. Constitution would accord Nancy Cruzan a 
right that “would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment 
from her” under the specific circumstances of her case.54 In addressing that 
question, the Court referred to its own prior jurisprudence concerning the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in light of decisions by 
various state courts concerning the doctrine of informed consent.55 
                                                                                                             
 48. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 416–17 (Mo. 1988) (en banc). 
 49. Id. at 417–18. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 419–20. 
 52. Id. at 425. 
 53. Finding that Nancy’s statements to her roommate regarding her desire to 
live or die under certain conditions were “unreliable for the purpose of 
determining her intent,” id. at 424, the Missouri Supreme Court concluded that 
the evidence was “insufficient to support the co-guardians claim to exercise 
substituted judgment on Nancy’s behalf.” Id. at 426. Finally, the court expressed 
its view that “[b]road policy questions bearing on life and death issues are more 
properly addressed by representative assemblies” than judicial bodies. Id.  
 54. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990). 
 55. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24–30 (1905) 
(balancing an individual’s liberty interest in declining an unwanted smallpox 
vaccination against the state’s interest in preventing disease); Washington v. 
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990) (recognizing that prisoners possess “a 
significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of 
antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment”); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980) (finding that liberty 
interests were implicated when an inmate is transferred to a mental hospital for 
mandatory behavior modification treatment); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 
(1979) (holding that an individual has a substantial liberty interest in not being 
confined unnecessarily for medical treatment). According to the Court in Cruzan:  




The Supreme Court expressed the issue before it as “whether the 
United States Constitution prohibits Missouri from choosing the rule of 
decision which it did.”56 In addressing that question, the Court first noted 
the logical correlation between the common law doctrine of informed 
consent and the right of a competent individual to refuse medical 
treatment.57 The Court then established the general framework for its 
analysis by noting that the opinions in the various lower courts regarding 
the scope of that right “demonstrate both similarity and diversity in their 
approaches to decision of what all agree is a perplexing question with 
unusually strong moral and ethical overtones.”58 Recognizing the 
significance of those moral and ethical issues from the perspectives of law 
and public policy, the Court said that in deciding “a question of such 
magnitude and importance . . . it is the [better] part of wisdom not to 
attempt, by any general statement, to cover every possible phase of the 
subject.”59 
Having so framed the question, the Court focused its inquiry on the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s proscription against deprivations of liberty 
                                                                                                             
At common law, even the touching of one person by another without 
consent and without legal justification was a battery . . . . This notion of 
bodily integrity has been embodied in the requirement that informed 
consent is generally required for medical treatment . . . . The logical 
corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that the patient generally 
possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse treatment. Until . . . 
the seminal decision in In re Quinlan, the number of right-to-refuse-
treatment decisions was relatively few. Most of the earlier cases involved 
patients who refused medical treatment forbidden by their religious 
beliefs, thus implicating First Amendment rights as well as common-law 
rights of self-determination. More recently, however, with the advance 
of medical technology capable of sustaining life well past the point 
where natural forces would have brought certain death in earlier times, 
cases involving the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment have 
burgeoned . . . . As these cases demonstrate, the common-law doctrine 
of informed consent is viewed as generally encompassing the right of a 
competent individual to refuse medical treatment. Beyond that, these 
cases demonstrate both similarity and diversity in their approaches to 
decision of what all agree is a perplexing question with unusually strong 
moral and ethical overtones.  
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269–70, 277 (citations omitted). 
 56. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 277–78 (quoting Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 202 
(1897)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 




without due process of law, and it inferred from its prior decisions “[t]he 
principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment.”60 The Court went on to 
qualify the patient’s right, however, by noting that the finding of a liberty 
interest under the Due Process Clause was only the beginning of the 
inquiry. Rather, the Court stated that whether a person’s constitutional 
rights have been violated “must be determined by balancing his liberty 
interests against the relevant state interests.”61 
With respect to those state interests, the Court took notice of the fact 
that Missouri had adopted its high evidentiary standard in reliance “on its 
interest in the protection and preservation of human life, and there can be 
no gainsaying this interest.”62 The Court further noted that all states 
                                                                                                             
 60. Id. at 278. In support of this inference, the Court cited Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 24–30 (balancing an individual’s liberty 
interest in declining an unwanted smallpox vaccine against the State’s interest in 
preventing disease). The Court further noted that its decisions prior to the 
incorporation of the Fourth Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment analyzed 
searches and seizures involving the body under the Due Process Clause and were 
thought to implicate substantial liberty interests. Id. (citing Breithaupt v. Abram, 
352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957)) (“As against the right of an individual that his person 
be held inviolable . . . must be set the interests of society . . . .”). The Court also 
cited Washington v. Harper. Harper, 494 U.S. at 221–22 (in the course of holding 
that a State’s procedures for administering antipsychotic medication to prisoners 
were sufficient to satisfy due process concerns, the Court recognized that 
prisoners possess “a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted 
administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment”); see also id. at 229 (holding that “[t]he forcible 
injection of medication into a nonconsenting person’s body represents a 
substantial interference with that person’s liberty”); Vitek, 445 U.S. at 490 
(holding that the transfer to mental hospital coupled with mandatory behavior 
modification treatment implicated liberty interests); Parham, 442 U.S. at 600 
(“[A] child, in common with adults, has a substantial liberty interest in not being 
confined unnecessarily for medical treatment . . . .”); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278–79. 
 61. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 
321 (1982) (citing Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982))) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). These state interests include: (1) the interests in preserving life, 
see, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1239 (N.J. 1985); (2) preventing suicide, 
id. at 1223; (3) preserving the ethical integrity of the medical profession, id.; and 
(4) protecting members of vulnerable groups, see, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281. 
 62. Cruzan, 497 U.S at 280. Although the Court addressed only the 
constitutionality of Missouri’s heightened evidentiary standard for confirming 
that a surrogate’s decision reflects the patient’s preference, the law is clear that 
the state’s interest applies even when the patient speaks for himself: 




demonstrate their commitment to life by treating homicide as a serious 
crime and that a majority of states impose criminal penalties on persons 
who assist others in committing suicide.63 Even with respect to a 
competent patient who expresses an informed refusal of nutrition and 
hydration, the Cruzan Court opined that “[w]e do not think a State is 
required to remain neutral in the face of an informed and voluntary 
decision by a physically able adult to starve to death.”64 Finally, the Court 
noted that the state has an unqualified interest in the preservation of life: 
“[W]e think a State may properly decline to make judgments about the 
‘quality’ of life that a particular individual may enjoy, and simply assert 
an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life to be weighed 
against the constitutionally protected interests of the individual.”65 
The Cruzan Court thus effectively dispensed with any notion that a 
patient might enjoy an unbridled liberty interest in the refusal of life-
sustaining treatment, whether the patient refuses directly or indirectly by 
a surrogate. 
B. The “Positive” Right of a Terminally Ill Patient to Receive the 
Assistance of a Physician in Committing Suicide, and the Problematic 
Relationship Between Sedation to Unconsciousness, Assisted Suicide, 
and Euthanasia 
In contrast with the mere tranquilizing effect of sedation to 
unconsciousness, assisted suicide involves the self-administration of a 
barbiturate in a dosage a physician prescribes for the specific purpose of 
                                                                                                             
The choice between life and death is a deeply personal decision of obvious 
and overwhelming finality. We believe Missouri may legitimately seek to 
safeguard the personal element of this choice through the imposition of 
heightened evidentiary requirements. It cannot be disputed that the Due 
Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as an interest in refusing 
life-sustaining medical treatment. Not all incompetent patients will have 
loved ones available to serve as surrogate decisionmakers. And even where 
family members are present, “[t]here will, of course, be some unfortunate 
situations in which family members will not act to protect a patient.” 
Id. at 281 (quoting In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 447 (N.J. 1987)). A state is entitled 
to guard against potential abuses in such situations. Similarly, a state is entitled to 
consider that a judicial proceeding to make a determination regarding an 
incompetent's wishes may very well not be an adversarial one, with the added 
guarantee of accurate factfinding that the adversary process brings with it. See id. 
See also Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 515–16 (1990). 
 63. Cruzan, 497 U.S at 281. 
 64. Id. at 280. 
 65. Id. at 282. 




enabling the patient to immediately terminate his own life. Euthanasia, on 
the other hand, entails one person’s affirmative act to bring about the death 
of another—generally by the administration of a lethal dose of medication 
such as that employed in assisted suicide. Although the practices of 
sedation to unconsciousness, assisted suicide, and euthanasia differ in 
terms of the actor’s identity and clinical method, they are similar because 
each represents an active intervention certain to result in the patient’s 
death, whether immediate—as in the case of assisted suicide and 
euthanasia—or eventual—as in the case of sedation to unconsciousness. 
This common result renders all of these measures ethically and morally 
problematic.66  
Euthanasia and assisted suicide are especially dubious from an ethical 
perspective because the procedures purposely result in the patient’s 
immediate death. The ethical challenges sedation to unconsciousness 
poses, however, vary with the manner and circumstances under which the 
physician administers the sedative, making questions about the propriety 
of the practice both subtler and more case-specific than the infamy 
commonly associated with euthanasia and assisted suicide. 
Such weighty ethical concerns invoke equally significant questions of 
law, and the Supreme Court has twice issued writs of certiorari to address 
facial challenges asserted on Equal Protection and Due Process grounds 
concerning the constitutionality of statutory prohibitions against assisted 
suicide. Washington v. Glucksberg67 and Vacco v. Quill68 represent the 
Court’s most recent expressions concerning this issue, and they reflect the 
full evolution of thought concerning the legal implications of end-of-life 
decision-making in the contexts of both the right to “passively” refuse life-
sustaining treatment and the right to “actively” receive an intervention that 
will cause death directly and immediately. Although these cases involved 
only the constitutional implications of physician-assisted suicide, the 
Court informed its inquiry concerning that issue with reference to the 
closely related practice of sedation to unconsciousness. 
Four physicians, three gravely ill patients, and Compassion in Dying, 
a nonprofit organization that counsels people who are considering assisted 
suicide, initiated Glucksberg.69 These plaintiffs asserted the existence of a 
substantive due process right to commit suicide with the assistance of a 
                                                                                                             
 66. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 7.01[C]. 
 67. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).  
 68. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
 69. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 707–08. Glucksberg was initiated in the U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Washington. Compassion in Dying v. 
Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev’d, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 
1995), aff’d en banc, 79 F.3d 790, rev’d, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702. 




physician, and the district court agreed that they possessed such a right.70 
Relying primarily on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey71 and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of 
Health,72 the court held that Washington’s ban on assisted suicide placed 
“an undue burden on the exercise of [that] constitutionally protected 
liberty interest.”73  
Although a panel of the Ninth Circuit initially reversed the district 
court decision,74 the appeals court later affirmed the lower court’s holding 
when rehearing the case en banc,75 concluding that “the Constitution 
encompasses a due process liberty interest in controlling the time and 
manner of one’s death—that there is, in short, a constitutionally 
recognized ‘right to die.’”76 More specifically, and in light of that liberty 
interest, the Ninth Circuit held that Washington’s prohibition against 
assisted suicide was unconstitutional “as applied to terminally ill 
competent adults who wish to hasten their deaths with medication 
prescribed by their physicians.”77  
                                                                                                             
 70. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 708. More specifically, the plaintiffs claimed 
“the existence of a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment which 
extends to a personal choice by a mentally competent, terminally ill adult to 
commit physician-assisted suicide.” Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1459. 
They complained that Washington’s statutory prohibition against “caus[ing]” or 
“aid[ing]” a suicide violated, on its face, the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution. Id. at 1458–59. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060(1) (1998). 
Washington’s Natural Death Act specifically excluded from the definition of a 
suicide “[t]he withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment” in 
accordance with the patient’s direction. Id. § 70.122.070(1) (1998). See also 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 707. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent 
part: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 71. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 72. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 328 (1990). 
 73. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1465. The District Court also held 
that the Washington statute violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 1467. The 
Ninth Circuit, however, did not reach the equal protection issue when the case 
came before that court on appeal. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d 586, aff’d en 
banc, 79 F.3d 790, rev’d, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702. 
 74. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 594. 
 75. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 798. 
 76. Id. at 816. 
 77. Id. at 837. The Ninth Circuit did not find the Washington statute to be 
invalid on its face. Id. 




The Supreme Court reversed.78 The Court framed the issue before it 
as “whether the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause 
includes a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to 
assistance in doing so.”79 In resolving that question, the Court undertook 
a careful review of “our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices” 
that treated as a crime any act of assisting a person in the commission of 
suicide.80 After noting that most states treated one’s assistance in a suicide 
as a crime at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified,81 that nearly 
every state defined assisted suicide as a crime at the time the Court was 
deciding the case, and that federal law expressly prohibited the use of 
federal funds to support the commission of suicide with the assistance of 
a physician,82 the Court found in these facts a longstanding tradition that 
represented “the States’ commitment to the protection and preservation of 
all human life.”83 
Though recognizing that the Court in Cruzan had “assumed, and 
strongly suggested, that the Due Process Clause protects the traditional 
right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment,”84 the Court refused 
to extend its assumption to embrace assisted suicide. After emphasizing 
that the right to refuse treatment was grounded in the common law notion 
of informed consent rather than “abstract concepts of personal autonomy,” 
the Court noted: 
Given the common-law rule that forced medication was a battery, 
and the long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse 
                                                                                                             
 78. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735–36. The majority opinion in Glucksberg was 
joined by Justices Scalia, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justices O’Connor, 
Ginsberg, Breyer, Stevens, and Souter each filed concurring opinions. Id. at 736–92. 
 79. Id. at 723. 
 80. Id. at 710. 
 81. Id. at 715. The Court also noted that the American Law Institute’s Model 
Penal Code, which prohibited the “aiding” of a suicide, played a significant role 
in prompting many states in the 20th century to enact or revise their bans against 
assisted suicide. Moreover, the Court noted that those bans had been reaffirmed 
in the years prior to Glucksberg and Quill, and that other changes had been 
wrought in the law to protect the interests of the terminally ill, such as the 
enactment of “living will” statutes, other provisions that expressly recognized the 
role of surrogates in making health care decisions, and provisions dealing with the 
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. Id. at 715–16. 
 82. Id. at 710. The Court noted that, at the time of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, 
44 states had statutes prohibiting assisted suicide, and three others had enacted such 
statutes before the case reached the Supreme Court. Id. at 710–11 n.8. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 720. 




unwanted medical treatment, our assumption was entirely 
consistent with this Nation’s history and constitutional traditions. 
The decision to commit suicide with the assistance of another may 
be just as personal and profound as the decision to refuse 
unwanted medical treatment, but it has never enjoyed similar legal 
protection. Indeed, the two acts are widely and reasonably 
regarded as quite distinct.85 
The Court thus based its holding primarily on the distinction between 
a person’s right to refuse an unwanted touching and one’s right to demand 
a desired one, again with reference to the support it found in “this Nation’s 
history and [] traditions.”86 
Quill is like Glucksberg in that three physicians and three gravely ill 
patients asserted interests in assisted suicide.87 In contrast with the due 
process focus of Glucksberg, however, Quill raised equal protection 
concerns.88 More specifically, the plaintiffs in Quill argued that because 
New York law permitted competent patients to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment, and because the refusal of such treatment was tantamount to 
assisted suicide, the state’s ban on the latter practice violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.89 
The lower court rejected the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim. 
Focusing on the state’s “obvious legitimate interests in preserving life, and 
in protecting vulnerable persons,” the court found it “hardly unreasonable 
or irrational for the State to recognize a difference between allowing nature 
to take its course, even in the most severe situations, and intentionally 
using an artificial death-producing device.”90 
                                                                                                             
 85. Id. at 725. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 797. Quill and Glucksberg were also similar in the sense that the 
patients in both cases died before the issues reached the Supreme Court. Id. at 
707; Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 797 (1997). 
 88. Quill, 521 U.S. at 797. 
 89. Id. The New York law at issue in Quill provided that “[a] person is guilty 
of manslaughter in the second degree when . . . [h]e intentionally causes or aids 
another person to commit suicide. Manslaughter in the second degree is a class C 
felony.” N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 1998). In contrast with this 
express prohibition against aiding a suicide, New York law quite clearly provided 
that a competent person had the right to refuse medical treatment, even if his 
refusal would result in death. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2960–79 (McKinney 
1993); see Quill, 521 U.S. at 797 n.2. 
 90. Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 84–85 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d in part 
and rev’d in part, Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev’d, Quill, 521 
U.S. 793. 




On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, finding that New York law 
does not treat equally all competent persons who are in the final stages of 
a terminal illness and who wish to hasten their deaths.91 The court based 
this conclusion on the fact that: 
“[T]hose in the final stages of terminal illness who are on life-
support systems are allowed to hasten their deaths by directing the 
removal of such systems; but those who are similarly situated, 
except for the previous attachment of life-sustaining equipment, 
are not allowed to hasten death by self-administering prescribed 
drugs.” . . . “[T]he ending of life by [the withdrawal of life-support 
systems] is nothing more nor less than assisted suicide.”92  
The appeals court then concluded that New York’s statutory distinction 
between assisted suicide and the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment 
was not rationally related to any legitimate state interest and, therefore, 
that it violated the Equal Protection Clause.93  
Consistent with its reversal of the Ninth Circuit in Glucksberg under 
the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit’s 
Equal Protection analysis in Quill. Denying that it should treat the refusal 
of treatment and assisted suicide the same simply because they both hasten 
death,94 the Court focused on the fact that the New York statute drew no 
unlawful distinction between terminally ill persons because “[e]veryone, 
regardless of physical condition, is entitled, if competent, to refuse 
unwanted lifesaving medical treatment; no one is permitted to assist a 
suicide.”95 The majority drew support for its holding from the AMA’s 
amicus brief, which contended that members of the medical profession 
“widely recognized and endorsed” the substantive distinction between 
suicide and the refusal of treatment.96 The Court stated that this distinction 
was “important,” “logical,” and “rational,” and that it “comports with 
fundamental legal principles of causation and intent.”97 
                                                                                                             
 91. Quill, 80 F.3d 716. 
 92. Quill, 521 U.S. at 798 (quoting Quill, 80 F.3d at 727, 729) (alteration in 
original). 
 93. Id. at 799. 
 94. Id. at 809. As in Glucksberg, Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion 
in Quill and Justices Scalia, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas joined him; 
Justices O’Connor, Ginsburg, Breyer, Stevens, and Souter each filed concurring 
opinions. Id. at 809–10.  
 95. Id. at 800. 
 96. Id. at 801.  
 97. Id. at 800–01. 




The Quill Court found the distinction between assisted suicide and the 
refusal of life-sustaining treatment relevant from a causation perspective 
by noting that a patient who refuses treatment will die from the natural 
progression of the underlying disease, whereas a patient who receives a 
lethal concoction will die from the body’s reaction to the foreign matter.98 
In terms of intent, the Court found that physicians who comply with a 
patient’s request to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment do not 
necessarily act with the intent of causing death,99 but that those physicians 
who provide assistance in committing suicide “must, necessarily and 
indubitably, intend primarily that the patient be made dead.”100  
The Quill Court, however, refused to infer a physician’s intent to cause 
death when employing aggressive palliative measures to control a 
patient’s pain.101 This distinction between palliative sedation, on the one 
                                                                                                             
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 802 (quoting Assisted Suicide in the United States: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 
2d Sess., 367 (1996) (testimony of Dr. Leon R. Kass)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Whether intentionally or not, this conclusion is consistent with the line 
of reasoning the American Hospital Association presented in its amicus brief 
concerning the finding of intent. That argument focused on the different responses 
one might expect to follow when a patient continues to live after the withdrawal 
of treatment, on the one hand, and after a failed suicide attempt, on the other. The 
patient who requested only the withdrawal of treatment presumably would be 
allowed to continue living. In contrast, the only rational course of action for the 
patient who sought assistance in committing suicide would be to try again. This 
argument provides a meaningful contextual reference point in the clinical setting 
for the doctrine of double effect as a supplement to the traditional legal notion of 
intent, which relates to “the exercise of intelligent will, the mind being fully aware 
of the nature and consequences of the act which is about [t]o be done, and with 
such knowledge, and with full liberty of action, willing and electing to do it.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 810 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted). This argument 
not only accommodates the unique nature of the relationship that exists between 
a physician and a patient; it also implicitly recognizes that the physician-patient 
relationship is governed by professional norms that justify a presumption that the 
physician always acts with the intent to preserve life rather than cause death. 
 101. Quill, 521 U.S. at 807–08 n.11 (rejecting the respondents’ argument that 
“the State irrationally distinguishes between physician-assisted suicide and 
‘terminal sedation,’ a process respondents characterize as ‘induc[ing] barbiturate 
coma and then starv[ing] the person to death’”). The Court recognized that the 
practice of palliative sedation is based on informed consent and the principle of 
double effect: “Just as a State may prohibit assisting suicide while permitting 
patients to refuse unwanted lifesaving treatment, it may permit palliative care 




hand, and euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide on the other, 
acknowledged implicitly the principle of double effect and embraced the 
reasoning a group of bioethics professors espoused in their amicus brief: 
Providing medication to control pain has always been a legitimate 
and lawful medical act, even if death . . . is risked. Most invasive 
medical interventions carry the risk of death or disability. But if a 
patient dies during surgery, the surgeon is not guilty of homicide. 
This is because there is a real difference between an intended 
result and an unintended but accepted consequence of medical 
care where the goal is to benefit the patient.102 
Although the holdings in Glucksberg and Quill invoked the doctrine 
of double effect to distinguish palliative sedation from physician-assisted 
suicide from a constitutional perspective, Justices O’Connor, Breyer, and 
Stevens expressly limited their concurring opinions to the specific facts 
under review in those cases. Justice O’Connor, for example, suggested that 
the Court might reach a different result if presented with an as-applied 
challenge that established a legal impediment to effective pain relief. 
Emphasizing that neither Washington nor New York law raised any barriers 
to a physician’s ability to manage a patient’s pain, she explained that it was 
unnecessary for the Court to reach the question of whether there exists a 
“constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of 
[one’s] imminent death.”103 More specifically, Justice O’Connor noted that 
the plaintiffs in Glucksberg and Quill had raised only facial challenges to 
the laws of Washington and New York and noted that “in these States a 
patient who is suffering from a terminal illness and who is experiencing 
great pain has no legal barriers to obtaining medication, from qualified 
physicians, to alleviate that suffering, even to the point of causing 
unconsciousness and hastening death.”104 Justice O’Connor thus qualified 
implicitly her concurrence upon the availability of sedation to 
unconsciousness.105 Justice Breyer adopted the same view:  
[A]s Justice [O’Connor] points out, the laws before us do not force 
a dying person to undergo [severe physical] pain. Rather, the laws 
                                                                                                             
related to that refusal, which may have the foreseen but unintended ‘double effect’ 
of hastening the patient’s death.” Id. 
 102. Brief for Bioethics Professors Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 
18, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (No. 95-1858, 96-110). 
 103. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736 (1997) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).  
 104. Id. at 736–37. 
 105. Id. at 736.  




of New York and of Washington do not prohibit doctors from 
providing patients with drugs sufficient to control pain despite the 
risk that those drugs themselves will kill . . . . [W]ere state law to 
prevent the provision of palliative care, including the 
administration of drugs as needed to avoid pain at the end of life—
then the law’s impact upon serious and otherwise unavoidable 
physical pain . . . would be more directly at issue. And as Justice 
[O’Connor] suggests, the Court might have to revisit its 
conclusions in these cases.106  
Justice Breyer also indicated that he would go one step further in the 
face of an impediment to effective pain control by framing the question 
more specifically: “[A]t its core would lie personal control over the 
manner of death, professional medical assistance, and the avoidance of 
unnecessary and severe physical suffering—combined.”107 Justice Breyer 
thus implied that he would find a due process “right to die with dignity” if 
state law prevented the provision of sedation to unconsciousness.108  
Justice Stevens similarly qualified his concurrence, stating that the 
Court’s holding in Glucksberg:  
[D]oes not foreclose the possibility that some application of [a 
statute that prohibits assisted suicide] may impose an intolerable 
intrusion on the patient’s freedom. There remains room for 
vigorous debate about the outcome of particular cases that are not 
necessarily resolved by the opinions announced today. How such 
cases may be decided will depend on their specific facts. In my 
judgment, however, it is clear that the so-called “unqualified 
interest in the preservation of human life” . . . is not itself sufficient 
to outweigh the interest in liberty that may justify the only possible 
means of preserving a dying patient’s dignity and alleviating her 
intolerable suffering.109  
Each of these concurring opinions suggests that it was only the absence of 
a legal impediment to the availability of sedation to unconsciousness in 
Washington or New York that enabled Justices O’Connor, Breyer, and 
Stevens to join the majority of the Court in Glucksberg and Quill. 
At their cores, the holdings in the assisted suicide cases of Glucksberg 
and Quill reflect a subtle stand-off between members of the Court who 
                                                                                                             
 106. Id. at 791–92 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 107. Id. at 790. 
 108. Id. at 791. 
 109. Id. at 751–52 (Souter, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 




held different visions about the appropriate balance between the patient’s 
right to self-determination and the state’s interest in preserving life.110 The 
only collective certainty, or least common denominator, to be gleaned 
from these cases is that a terminally ill patient does not possess a 
constitutional right to assisted suicide on either due process or equal 
protection grounds in a state that imposes no legal impediment to effective 
pain relief. Although the concurring opinions suggest that such relief 
would include sedation to unconsciousness, the majority opinion did not 
address specifically the scope of a patient’s right to palliative care. 
III. THE STATUS OF SEDATION TO UNCONSCIOUSNESS UNDER THE 
LOUISIANA NATURAL DEATH ACT 
The unresolved question about the legal status of sedation to 
unconsciousness can leave physicians just as unsettled about the 
consequences of employing aggressive palliative measures as they were 
about complying with their patients’ requests to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining treatment prior to the enactment of advance directive statutes. 
The uncertainty in both situations stems from the inherent conflict between 
the patient’s interest in autonomy and the state’s interest in preserving life.  
The Natural Death Act111 provides a meaningful reference point for 
addressing this question in Louisiana. Although the range of contemporary 
palliative care options now available might have been unknown to the 
legislature at the time it adopted the Act, the statute is broad enough in 
purpose, policy, and expression of legislative intent to inform our 
understanding about the scope of a patient’s right under Louisiana law to 
receive palliative care when exercising his right to withhold or withdraw 
life-sustaining treatment.  
                                                                                                             
 110. Apparently relying on the doctrine of double effect, the majority of 
justices refused to recognize one’s right to assisted suicide, but they found that 
sedation to unconsciousness posed no meaningful challenge to the state’s interest 
in preserving life. Although Justices O’Connor, Breyer, and Stevens agreed with 
the majority under the specific facts of Glucksberg and Quill, they suggested that 
they might reach a different result in an “as applied” challenge to an assisted 
suicide ban, particularly where there exists a legal impediment to the availability 
of palliative sedation. See id. at 736 (O’Connor, J., concurring), 741–42 (Stevens, 
J., concurring), and 790 (Breyer, J., concurring). These concurring justices found 
it unnecessary to address that question in Glucksberg and Quill simply because 
the plaintiffs there had asserted only a facial challenge and had not presented 
evidence of such an impediment. 
 111. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151 (2019). 




A. The Purpose and Scope of the Natural Death Act 
Like its counterparts in other jurisdictions, the Act reflects the 
negative implication of the doctrine of informed consent: if a physician is 
obligated to obtain a patient’s consent prior to providing treatment, the 
clear inference is that the patient has a corresponding right to deny that 
consent even in the face of death.112 As a legislative response to the body 
of jurisprudence that followed in the wake of Quinlan,113 the statute seeks 
not only to balance the competing interests of the individual in self-
determination114 and the state in the preservation of life,115 but also to 
alleviate physicians’ concerns about potentially adverse legal and 
professional consequences of complying with a patient’s request that life-
                                                                                                             
 112. See, e.g., Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960) (“Anglo-
American law starts with the premise of thorough-going self determination. It 
follows that each man is considered to be master of his own body, and he may, if 
he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery, 
or other medical treatment. A doctor might well believe that an operation or form 
of treatment is desirable or necessary but the law does not permit him to substitute 
his own judgment for that of the patient by any form of artifice or deception.”). 
See also In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (N.J. 1985).  
 113. See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 7.01[C]. Although 
several of the early cases arose in the context of competent patients who objected 
to treatment either on religious grounds or simply as a matter of personal 
preference, the rapid emergence of advanced medical technology since the 1970s 
provided the main impetus for the modern so-called “right-to-die” cases. Such 
technology has enabled biological life to be sustained almost indefinitely by a 
combination of devices for artificial respiration, circulation, feeding, and 
hydration. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).  
 114. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151(A)(1) (“[A]ll persons have the 
fundamental right to control the decisions relating to their own medical care, 
including the decision to have life-sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn 
in instances where such persons are diagnosed as having a terminal and 
irreversible condition.”). 
 115. See, e.g., id. § 40:1151.9(E) (“It is the policy of the state of Louisiana that 
human life is of the highest and inestimable value through natural death. When 
interpreting this Subpart, any ambiguity shall be interpreted to preserve human 
life . . . .”); id. § 40:1151(B)(1) (“The legislature intends that the provisions of 
this Subpart are permissive and voluntary.”); id. § 40:1151(B)(2) (“It is the intent 
of the legislature that nothing in this Subpart shall be construed to require the 
making of a declaration pursuant to this Subpart.”); id. § 40:1151.9(A) (“Nothing 
in this Subpart shall be construed to condone, authorize, or approve assistance to 
suicide, mercy killing, or euthanasia; or to permit any affirmative or deliberate act 
or omission to end life other than to permit the natural process of dying.”); MEISEL 
& CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 7.07[D]. 




sustaining treatment be withheld or withdrawn.116 For all practical 
purposes, the Act strikes that balance by codifying the principles reflected 
in the body of jurisprudence and the pronouncements of professional 
medical ethics concerning these significant questions that arose out of 
Quinlan and its progeny.  
Although the Act acknowledges in broad, general terms that patients 
possess a fundamental right to control decisions related to the provision of 
life-sustaining treatment, it does not attempt to define the precise 
boundaries of that right.117 Those elusive limits remain the subject of 
                                                                                                             
 116. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.7(A)(1) (“Any health care facility 
[or] physician . . . shall not be subject to criminal prosecution or civil liability or 
be deemed to have engaged in unprofessional conduct as a result of the 
withholding or the withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures . . . in accordance 
with the provisions of this Subpart.”). According to Meisel and Cerminara, 
“[Advance directive] statutes are intended to provide assurance to individuals that 
their wishes will be respected and to provide assurance to health care providers 
that they will be immune from legal liability if they rely on these instructions.” 
MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 7.01[A].  
 117. See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 2.01. These issues 
originated when surrogates for permanently unconscious patients began to refuse 
treatment that offered no hope of either restoring the patient’s capacity or 
reversing the dying process. The most prominent of these cases in the United 
States is Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health. 497 U.S. 261, 328 
(1990). See also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 22, at 170–81. Although 
one’s exercise of this right is generally not controversial, it becomes problematic 
when the refusal relates to treatment that would either prevent death or extend the 
life of a patient who has been diagnosed with a terminal condition. This would 
occur because a patient’s refusal of treatment in either of those cases would bring 
his interest in self-determination into conflict with the state’s interest in preserving 
life. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1239. Some commentators have 
observed, however, that the courts predominately consider the state as having no 
greater interest in preserving a particular life than does the individual whose life 
is at issue. See, e.g., MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID 
ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE LAW & ETHICS 531 (7th ed. 2007). The U.S. 
Supreme Court noted in Washington v. Glucksberg, however, that the states “‘may 
properly decline to make judgments about the “quality” of life that a particular 
individual may enjoy,’” and that “[t]his remains true, as Cruzan makes clear, even 
for those who are near death.” 521 U.S. 702, 729–30 (1997) (quoting Cruzan, 497 
U.S. at 282). Without regard to the perceived momentum of the states toward 
qualifying their interests in preserving life, that fact would not bear upon the issue 
when the patient has affirmatively requested treatment. 
Meisel has summarized the general judicial consensus concerning this right 
as follows: (1) patients, whether competent or incompetent, have both a common 
law and a constitutional right to refuse treatment; (2) the state’s interest in 




discussion among scholars and practitioners in the disciplines of law, 
medicine, and bioethics.118 Whether intentionally or not, this ambiguity 
reflects the inherent tension between the competing interests of the 
individual in the exercise of autonomy and the state in the preservation of 
life, leaving these issues open to the sort of reflection necessary to fully 
consider the broad societal implications technological developments in the 
field of medicine pose as they come about. At the same time, the ambiguity 
gives health care providers sufficient leeway to measure the bounds of 
their obligations carefully from an ethical perspective and exercise 
professional discretion in individual cases within the limits of those ethical 
norms.119 
The Act establishes a baseline for defining the point at which one’s 
right to refuse treatment is absolute. The express terms of the statute 
affirmatively recognize only the right of a terminally ill patient to refuse 
                                                                                                             
opposing a competent patient’s right to forego life-sustaining treatment is 
“virtually nonexistent,” and the state’s interest is “very weak” with respect to 
incompetent patients who have a dim prognosis for recovery—although the state 
would not likely disavow that interest if the patient has chosen not to exercise his 
right to refuse treatment (as Professor Meisel notes, “The right of self-
determination has . . . traditionally been thought to require that treatment not be 
foregone without the informed consent of one legally authorized to provide it.” 
MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 2.06[A]); (3) decisions about life-
sustaining treatment generally should take place in the clinical setting, although 
courts are able to resolve disputes about those decisions; (4) surrogate decision 
makers for incompetent patients should express the patient’s own preferences to 
the extent made known prior to the loss of capacity, and to the extent the patient’s 
preference is unknown, decisions should be made on the basis of the patient’s best 
interests; (5) physicians and surrogates may rely on an incompetent patient’s 
advance directive in ascertaining the patient’s preferences concerning life-
sustaining procedures; (6) artificial nutrition and hydration is a form of medical 
treatment that may be withheld or withdrawn under the same conditions as other 
forms of medical treatment; and (7) the withholding or withdrawal of medical 
treatment is both morally and ethically distinct from euthanasia and assisted 
suicide, id. § 2.02; preventing suicide, see, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1223; 
preserving the ethical integrity of the medical profession, id.; and protecting 
members of vulnerable groups, see, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281. 
 118. See, e.g., Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp., 1 A.3d 823, 830 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2010) (“[T]he public has at least an equal, if not greater, interest in a 
patient’s right to live than in a patient’s right to die.”). The courts also have 
recognized countervailing state interests in preventing suicide, safeguarding the 
integrity of the medical profession, and protecting innocent third parties. See, e.g., 
In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1223; MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 13.06. 
 119. See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, §§ 7.01–7.15. 




treatment that would merely prolong the dying process.120 The Act is silent 
with respect to one’s right to withhold treatment that offers a reasonable 
prospect of preserving life, leaving those questions to be resolved on a 
case-by-case basis with reference to the analyses of the courts in prior 
jurisprudence.121 Consistently with this silence, the statute provides that it 
is not to be construed in a manner that would condone euthanasia or 
assisted suicide.122 One might reasonably infer from the Act’s limitations 
                                                                                                             
 120. The Act provides that a competent patient has the right to personally 
direct the withholding or withdrawal of treatment in advance, and that a surrogate 
has the authority to do so on behalf of a “qualified patient” who has not made a 
previous declaration. See LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.4. Notwithstanding the 
general right, the Act expressly provides that a patient who has been diagnosed as 
having a “terminal and irreversible condition” has the right to withhold or 
withdraw “life-sustaining procedures,” which by definition serve only to prolong 
the dying process. Id. § 40:1151.2A(1). The statute defines a “life-sustaining 
procedure” as: 
 [A]ny medical procedure or intervention which . . . would serve only to 
prolong the dying process for a person diagnosed as having a terminal 
and irreversible condition, including such procedures as the invasive 
administration of nutrition and hydration and the administration of 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation. A “life-sustaining procedure” shall not 
include any measure deemed necessary to provide comfort care. 
Id. § 40:1151.1(8). The statute goes on to define a “terminal and irreversible 
condition” as “a condition caused by injury, disease, or illness which, within 
reasonable medical judgment, would produce death and for which the application 
of life-sustaining procedures would serve only to postpone the moment of death.” 
Id. § 40:1151.1(14). The definitions of “life-sustaining procedure” and “terminal 
and irreversible condition” are tautological.  
 121. Notwithstanding the narrow scope of these definitions, the Act provides 
that “[t]he provisions of this Subpart are cumulative with existing law pertaining 
to an individual’s right to consent or refuse to consent to medical or surgical 
treatment.” Id. § 40:1151.9(C). According to Meisel and Cerminara, advance 
directive statutes “are intended to preserve and supplement existing common law 
and constitutional rights and not to supersede or limit them.” See MEISEL & 
CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 7.03[B][2]. 
 122. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 40:1151.9(A) provides: “Nothing in this 
Subpart shall be construed to condone, authorize, or approve assistance to suicide, 
mercy killing, or euthanasia; or to permit any affirmative or deliberate act or 
omission to end life other than to permit the natural process of dying.” Louisiana  
Revised Statutes § 14:32.12 defines “[c]riminal assistance to suicide” as “(1) The 
intentional advising or encouraging of another person to commit suicide or the 
providing of the physical means or the knowledge of such means to another person 
for the purpose of enabling the other person to commit or attempt to commit 
suicide[;]” or “(2) [t]he intentional advising, encouraging, or assisting of another 
person to commit suicide, or the participation in any physical act which causes, 




a legislative intent to affirm the state’s traditional interest in preserving 
life, both when a patient has chosen not to exercise his right to refuse 
treatment as the Act recognizes and when he refuses treatment under 
circumstances that lie beyond its scope.123 
To give practical effect to the individual’s right of self-determination 
and the state’s interest in preserving life, the statute incorporates a 
narrowly tailored immunity scheme that insulates physicians from liability 
when they follow their patients’ instructions concerning the provision of 
life-sustaining treatment.124 In this manner, the statute reflects the 
legislature’s intent to alleviate physicians’ concerns about the legal and 
professional consequences of failing to provide treatment that would 
prolong a patient’s life.125 This immunity, however, arises only when the 
physician’s instructions fall within the express terms of the Act. 
                                                                                                             
aids, abets, or assists another person in committing or attempting to commit 
suicide.” Louisiana Revised Statutes § 40:1151.9(B) defines “suicide” as “the 
intentional and deliberate act of taking one’s own life through the performance of 
an act intended to result in death.” Louisiana Revised Statutes § 40:1151.9(C) 
exempts from the prohibition against assisted suicide: 
any licensed physician or other authorized licensed health care 
professional who either: (1) [w]ithholds or withdraws medical treatment 
in accordance with the provisions of LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.7[; or] 
(2) prescribes, dispenses, or administers any medication, treatment, or 
procedure if the intent is to relieve the patient’s pain or suffering and not 
to cause death. 
See also MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 7.07[D]. 
 123. The Act expressly states that one’s right to refuse treatment is a voluntary 
matter that rests solely within the patient’s discretion. LA. REV. STAT. § 
40:1151(B)(1)–(2). 
 124. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 40:1151.7(A)(1) provides:  
Any health care facility, physician, or other person acting under the 
direction of a physician shall not be subject to criminal prosecution or 
civil liability or be deemed to have engaged in unprofessional conduct 
as a result of the withholding or the withdrawal of life-sustaining 
procedures from a qualified patient. 
This immunity applies without regard to whether the patient expressed his decision 
directly or indirectly through a surrogate. See also MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra 
note 3, § 7.01[C]. 
 125. According to Professor Meisel, “statutes do not confer wholesale 
immunity; rather, most confer qualified immunity conditioned on the physician’s 
acting in good faith and pursuant to reasonable medical standards.” MEISEL & 
CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 7.10[E]; see also id. § 7.01[A] (“[Advance directive] 
statutes are intended to provide assurance to individuals that their wishes will be 
respected and to provide assurance to health care providers that they will be 
immune from legal liability if they rely on these instructions.”). 




B. Application of the Natural Death Act to Palliative Sedation 
Although aggressive palliative regimens are often necessary to 
alleviate the pain and suffering patients experience during the latter stages 
of a terminal illness, the Natural Death Act does not directly address the 
provision of palliative care. The Act’s silence, however, neither negates 
the Act’s relevance to this intervention nor renders it legally problematic. 
Rather, the literal terms of the statute suggest that one’s right to receive 
palliative care in Louisiana is incidental to and co-extensive with the 
statutory scope of the right to refuse treatment. 
This conclusion is grounded in two fundamental associations. First, 
because pain management protocols are a fundamental part of the 
professional standard of care, the physician’s obligation to mediate pain 
associated with a patient’s underlying medical condition will continue so 
long as the physician–patient relationship exists, and without regard to 
whether the patient exercises his right to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining treatment. Moreover, because the mere withholding of food and 
fluids is accompanied by its own physical discomfort, a patient who refuses 
treatment would be accorded the right to receive such palliative measures as 
may be necessary to relieve any consequential physical distress. To construe 
the Act otherwise would so militate against the exercise of one’s right to 
refuse treatment as to practically deny its very existence. 
In addition to this logical inference derived from the professional 
standard of care, a careful construction of the statute itself implies the 
legislature’s intent that the Act embrace palliative interventions such as 
sedation to unconsciousness so long as the physician employs it in a 
manner distinguished from assisted suicide and euthanasia. This 
conclusion rests upon the manner in which the statute expresses the scope 
of one’s right to refuse treatment, and which the Supreme Court’s opinions 
in the assisted suicide cases of Washington v. Glucksberg126 and Vacco v. 
Quill inform.127  
The Act provides that a patient who has been diagnosed as having a 
“terminal and irreversible condition” possesses the right to direct the 
withholding or withdrawal of “life-sustaining procedures.”128 The statute 
                                                                                                             
 126. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 127. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
 128. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151(A)(1) (entitled “purpose and findings”); id. § 
1151.2(A)(1) (entitled “patient for himself”); id. § 40:1151.4(A) (entitled 
“declaration for qualified patient”). Beyond this express recognition, the Act 
states that “[t]he provisions of this Subpart are cumulative with existing law 
pertaining to an individual’s right to consent or refuse to consent to medical or 
surgical treatment.” Id. § 40:1151.9(C).  




defines a “terminal and irreversible condition” as: “[A] continual [and] 
profound comatose state with no reasonable chance of recovery or a 
condition caused by injury, disease, or illness which, within reasonable 
medical judgment, would produce death and for which the application of 
life-sustaining procedures would serve only to postpone the moment of 
death.”129 It defines the related term, “life-sustaining procedure,” as: 
[A]ny medical procedure or intervention which . . . would serve 
only to prolong the dying process for a person diagnosed as having 
a terminal and irreversible condition, including such procedures 
as the invasive administration of nutrition and hydration and the 
administration of cardiopulmonary resuscitation. A “life-
sustaining procedure” shall not include any measure deemed 
necessary to provide comfort care.130 
The fact that the statute excludes comfort care from the treatment to 
be withheld when a terminally ill patient refuses artificial nutrition and 
hydration suggests that one’s right to receive palliative care for the 
discomfort associated with the absence of food and fluids is ancillary to 
his refusal of treatment. To construe the text in this manner would give 
practical effect to the Act’s underlying purpose of ensuring one’s right to 
a natural death in an age of technology that enables biological life to be 
extended almost indefinitely.131 On the other hand, to deny the right to 
palliative care when a patient refuses treatment would effectively negate 
the Natural Death Act itself. 
At the same time, the Act’s general focus on a “natural” death would 
preclude a patient from coupling a refusal of treatment with a contrived 
                                                                                                             
 129. Id. § 40:1151.1(14). 
 130. Id. § 40:1151.1(8) (emphasis added). 
 131. This general intent is most apparently reflected in the common name by 
which the statute has come to be known: the Louisiana Natural Death Act. This 
focus on natural death is also reflected in specific provisions of the statute. For 
example, the Act provides that “[i]t is the policy of the state of Louisiana that 
human life is of the highest and inestimable value through natural death.” Id. § 
40:1151.9(E). This essence also is reflected in provisions of the Act that identify 
the cause of one’s death as natural when it follows a refusal of life-sustaining 
treatment. For example, the statute provides that “[t]he removal of life-support 
systems or the failure to administer cardio-pulmonary resuscitation under this 
Subpart shall not be deemed to be the cause of death for purposes of insurance 
coverage.” Id. § 40:1151.9(B)(5). The Act also states that “[t]he withholding or 
withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from a qualified patient in accordance 
with the provisions of this Subpart shall not, for any purpose, constitute a suicide.” 
Id. § 40:1151.9(B)(1). 




claim for comfort care to disguise an act of euthanasia. Although the 
statute acknowledges reasonable and practical distinctions between 
decisions to withhold or withdraw treatment and acts that intentionally 
cause death, it also anticipates the possibility that physicians might engage 
in euthanasia or assisted suicide under the guise of mere palliation by 
expressly rejecting such measures. For example, the Act expressly 
provides that “[n]othing in this Subpart shall be construed to condone, 
authorize or approve assistance to suicide, mercy killing, or euthanasia; or 
to permit any affirmative or deliberate act or omission to end life other 
than to permit the natural process of dying.”132 Taken together, these 
express provisions of the statute suggest the legislature’s intention to 
recognize a patient’s right to comfort care in the form of sedation to 
unconsciousness, but only when the physician administers the sedative in 
accordance with the Act’s primary focus on a natural death. 
Consider, for example, the case of the esophageal cancer patient 
previously mentioned who declines medical intervention in the form of 
artificial nutrition and hydration when the disease progresses to the point 
that he can no longer receive sufficient nutrition and hydration by 
mouth.133 In addition to refusing treatment, he asks to be immediately 
sedated to unconsciousness to relieve the suffering expected to accompany 
the absence of food and fluids, with death by dehydration to be expected 
within a few days.  
The Act would accommodate the patient’s refusal of nutrition and 
hydration under these circumstances. A careful parsing of the text would 
reveal his inability to swallow as the requisite “terminal and irreversible 
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condition,”134 and it would identify the artificial provision of nutrition and 
hydration as the correlated “life-sustaining procedure” to be withheld.135  
Just as the Act would accommodate this patient’s refusal of food and 
fluids, it would likely embrace his request for sedation. This conclusion is 
grounded in logic, and the statute implies it. Given the law’s express 
recognition of the patient’s right to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration 
under these facts, as the requisite “life-sustaining procedure,” denying his 
right to relieve the distress accompanying the exercise of that right would 
be incongruous. Logic would compel the conclusion, not that the physician 
sedated the patient and withheld treatment so he would die, but that the 
physician sedated him to mitigate the suffering that otherwise would 
attend his exercise of a right the Act expressly recognizes. Under the facts 
of this example, the act of sedation is a form of comfort care that merely 
facilitates one’s exercise of the right to refuse treatment. As previously 
noted, the statute accommodates this view implicitly by excluding from 
the definition of a “life-sustaining procedure” “any measure deemed 
necessary to provide comfort care.”136 
                                                                                                             
 134. The Act defines a “[t]erminal and irreversible condition” as “a condition 
caused by . . . disease . . . which . . . would produce death and for which the 
application of life-sustaining procedures would serve only to postpone the 
moment of death.” LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.1(14) (emphasis added). It is 
significant to note that the literal terms of the statute do not identify the underlying 
disease of esophageal cancer as the qualifying “terminal and irreversible 
condition,” even though it is the disease that will eventually give rise to the 
conditions that precipitate death. Rather, the statute defines a “terminal and 
irreversible condition” as a “condition caused by” a disease; i.e., the statute 
arguably applies only to a “condition” that is a consequence of the disease rather 
than to the disease itself. Id. (emphasis added). Although this definition is 
complex, it reflects the state’s continuing interest in the preservation of life. The 
literal terms of the statute would not recognize the right of a patient diagnosed 
with esophageal cancer to refuse nutrition and hydration merely because she had 
been diagnosed with an illness that her physician has determined to be terminal. 
The statute comes into play only when the disease manifests itself in the form of 
a condition that requires the artificial provision of food and fluids. 
 135. Just as the Act defines a “terminal and irreversible condition” only with 
reference to a “life-sustaining procedure,” it defines a “life-sustaining procedure” only 
with reference to a “terminal and irreversible condition.” Id. § 40:1151.1(8), (14). 
According to Louisiana Revised Statutes § 40:1151.1(8), a “terminal and irreversible 
condition” includes “any medical procedure or intervention which . . . would serve 
only to prolong the dying process for a person diagnosed as having a terminal and 
irreversible condition, including such procedures as the invasive administration of 
nutrition and hydration . . . .” These tautological and narrow definitions suggest the 
caution with which the legislature approached the Act. 
 136. Id. § 40:1151.1(8). 




This analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Vacco 
v. Quill,137 which recognized a distinction between assisted suicide and the 
refusal of life-sustaining treatment on the basis of causation. Noting that a 
patient who refuses treatment will die from the natural progression of the 
underlying disease, the Court found that a physician who complies with a 
patient’s request to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment does 
not necessarily act with the intent to cause death. In contrast, because a 
patient who receives a lethal concoction will die from the body’s reaction 
to the foreign substance, the Court found that a physician who provides 
assistance in committing suicide “must, necessarily and indubitably, 
intend that the patient be made dead.”138 In the specific context of sedation 
to unconsciousness, however, the Quill Court refused to infer a physician’s 
intent to cause death when he employs aggressive palliative measures 
merely to control a patient’s pain, implicitly acknowledging the doctrine 
of double effect.139 
Although this analysis may obviate most concerns about the sort of 
potentially self-serving expressions of “intent” that legitimately disturb 
those who reject sedation to unconsciousness on the grounds that it is 
analogous to euthanasia, it cannot alleviate those concerns in all cases. 
Consider, for example, the case of the rheumatoid arthritis patient 
previously discussed who seeks to be sedated immediately and perpetually 
to unconsciousness as the only possible means of providing relief from his 
intractable pain.140 Recognizing that it would be futile to receive food and 
fluids when he is to be rendered permanently unconscious, the patient also 
asks that nutrition and hydration be withheld and that he be allowed to die.  
                                                                                                             
 137. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
 138. Id. at 802 (quoting Assisted Suicide in the United States: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 
2d Sess., 367 (1996) (testimony of Dr. Leon R. Kass)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 139. Quill, 521 U.S. at 802. This reasoning found considerable support among 
amici bioethics professors who argued that the principle of double effect 
encompassed aggressive palliative measures. According to these professors: 
Providing medication to control pain has always been a legitimate and 
lawful medical act, even if death . . . is risked. Most invasive medical 
interventions carry the risk of death or disability. But if a patient dies 
during surgery, the surgeon is not guilty of homicide. This is because 
there is a real difference between an intended result and an unintended 
but accepted consequence of medical care where the goal is to benefit 
the patient.  
Brief for Bioethics Professors Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 18, Vacco 
v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (No. 95-1858, 96-110). 
 140. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 




The facts of this case present a complexity not found in the esophageal 
cancer case discussed above. In that case, the progression of the disease 
directly caused the patient’s inability to receive sufficient nutrition by 
mouth, thereby rendering him dependent upon artificial sustenance. It was 
this direct linkage between the patient’s disease process and his inability 
to receive food and fluids on his own that satisfied the Act’s requisite 
“terminal and irreversible condition” and justified the withholding of 
artificial nutrition and hydration as a “life-sustaining procedure.”141 
This necessary linkage is tenuous, if not broken, in the case of the 
rheumatoid arthritis patient because his dependence on artificial nutrition 
and hydration would result from the administration of the sedative rather 
than the natural progression of the disease. This focus on the cause of the 
patient’s need for the treatment he seeks to decline is grounded in a careful 
reading of the statute. 
As previously noted, the Act provides that a patient who has been 
diagnosed as having a terminal and irreversible condition may direct the 
withholding or withdrawal of a life-sustaining procedure.142 The statute 
employs the words “terminal and irreversible condition” as a specific term 
of art that means “a condition caused by . . . disease . . . which . . . would 
produce death and for which the application of life-sustaining procedures 
would serve only to postpone the moment of death.”143 Although 
rheumatoid arthritis may be terminal and irreversible in a colloquial sense, 
the disease itself would not constitute a “terminal and irreversible 
condition” within the meaning of the Act; only a condition “caused by” 
the disease would fall within that definition. The patient’s right under the 
Act to refuse nutrition and hydration therefore would turn on the cause of 
his inability to naturally receive sustenance. 
Application of the Act would be clearest if the patient’s dependence 
on artificial nutrition and hydration could be directly tied to the 
progression of the disease process rather than the sedative. If, however, 
the patient’s inability to receive sustenance arose only when he was 
sedated to unconsciousness, it would be two steps removed from the 
underlying illness—the pain caused by the disease and the sedation 
administered to relieve his discomfort. Application of the Act would be 
questionable if this linkage were so tenuous as to define the sedative rather 
than the disease as the cause of his need for the artificial nutrition and 
hydration he seeks to refuse.144 
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 142. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.2 (2019). 
 143. Id. § 40:1151.1(14) (emphasis added). 
 144. Although the issue is raised here in the context of a patient who is 
immediately sedated to unconsciousness, the same definitional problem would 




An alternative view might avoid this uncertainty by applying a 
practical “but-for” causation analysis. By focusing on the fact that the act 
of sedation presented the only possible remedy to the intractable pain 
associated with the patient’s disease, this view would inextricably link the 
act of sedation with the patient’s pain in a way that identifies the disease 
as the ultimate cause of his need for artificial sustenance; after being 
sedated to unconsciousness to remedy his suffering caused by the disease, 
he would become dependent on artificial nutrition and hydration. By 
identifying the act of sedation with the patient’s pain and, in turn, 
identifying solely his disease as inducing his pain, this argument would 
suggest that the Act may accommodate both the sedation and the 
consequential withholding of nutrition and hydration.  
Without regard to the reasonable arguments for or against application 
of the Act in this case, however, those very arguments reveal an ambiguity 
in the statute that may deny one’s right to refuse life-sustaining treatment 
after having intentionally created the need for it. This situation may occur 
because the Act itself emphasizes as a matter of public policy that “human 
life is of the highest and inestimable value through natural death. When 
interpreting this Subpart, any ambiguity shall be interpreted to preserve 
human life . . . .”145  
These uncertainties flow from the Act’s structural focus on the causal 
relationship between the patient’s medical condition and the need for 
artificial nutrition and hydration. The Act’s focus is admittedly problematic 
when the suffering related to the underlying disease or injury can be relieved 
by sedation alone—i.e., when it would be unnecessary to withhold nutrition 
and hydration to relieve suffering, but futile to artificially provide it when 
the patient is to be maintained in an unconscious state until death. 
Although the Act’s structural focus on causation may be problematic 
when applied in such cases, it nevertheless provides an objective reference 
point for ensuring the state’s ability to invoke its interest in preserving life. 
Without the requisite causal relationship between a patient’s illness or 
injury and the need for artificial nutrition and hydration—and however 
distant the horizon of a “natural” death—virtually any terminal medical 
                                                                                                             
arise under the Act in terms of causation when the sedation is administered 
proportionately with the patient’s level of pain. Consider, for example, the case 
of a patient who, in the advanced stages of lung cancer, requests morphine and 
other sedatives in doses that increase proportionately as the intensity of his 
distress deepens with the progression of the disease. Expecting to eventually 
receive sedatives in doses that render him permanently unconscious, the patient 
asks that his physician withhold nutrition and hydration when he becomes unable 
to ingest them on his own. See, e.g., MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 7.06. 
 145. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.9(E). 




condition would suffice to recognize a patient’s right to dramatically 
accelerate the moment of death by coupling sedation to unconsciousness 
and the withholding of sustenance. To so disregard causation would be 
effectively to endorse euthanasia and convert the Act from its intended 
purpose into a safe harbor for its antithesis.  
At the core of this unresolved question is the fundamental difficulty of 
finding an appropriate way to balance the competing interests of the 
patient in self-determination and the state in preserving life. The fact that 
the legislature defined that balance in the Act with reference to causation, 
however, does not suggest that one’s right to palliative care is necessarily 
limited to cases that neatly fit into the statutory text; it simply reflects the 
fact that the legislature chose not to address the appropriate balance 
between the competing interests of the individual and the state in all 
circumstances. Cases that fall outside the purview of the Act therefore 
remain subject to resolution on an individual basis with reference to the 
ethical norms of the medical profession and the principles reflected in the 
jurisprudence.146 
In the rheumatoid arthritis case, for example, one might deny an intent 
to cause death by grounding an argument in the doctrine of double effect 
if the physician employed the sedative at the minimum dosage necessary 
to relieve the patient’s pain and suffering. This perspective suggests that 
the patient’s simultaneous loss of consciousness and the natural ability to 
receive nutrition and hydration—the latter of which would cause his 
death—were merely foreseeable but unintended consequences of a 
sedative employed at the minimum dosage necessary to relieve the 
suffering caused by his disease. Under this reasoning, the act of sedating 
the patient to unconsciousness would be treated as if it had been 
proportionally employed, because even proportionate sedation would 
eventually render the patient unconscious and naturally unable to receive 
food and fluids. Viewing sedation as proportionately employed would 
seek to circumvent the problematic causation element in the Act’s 
definition of a “terminal and irreversible condition” simply by looking 
beyond the limited scope of the Act to find an independent basis on which 
to justify the patient’s refusal of treatment.147  
                                                                                                             
 146. The Act expressly invokes the jurisprudence in cases that do not fall 
within its limited scope. According to Louisiana Revised Statutes § 40:1151.9(C): 
“The provisions of this Subpart are cumulative with existing law pertaining to an 
individual’s right to consent or refuse to consent to medical or surgical treatment.” 
 147. Commentators have expressed a wide range of views about how to 
resolve the tension in cases that implicate both the patient’s need for pain relief 
and societal concerns about euthanasia and the ethical integrity of the medical 
profession. See, e.g., Roger S. Magnusson, The Devil’s Choice: Re-Thinking Law, 




Not everyone, however, would subscribe to this application of the 
double effect doctrine, even if the circumstances suggest that it would be 
futile to provide food and fluids when the patient is to be maintained in a 
perpetually unconscious state to relieve his intractable suffering. A 
cautious observer might view this analysis as distorting the doctrine 
beyond its intended bounds by disguising the withholding of nutrition and 
hydration as a passive measure when, in fact, it constitutes an affirmative 
act wholly unrelated to the patient’s legitimate need for pain relief. This 
argument is most compelling when the act of sedation would satisfy that 
need on its own, revealing the withholding of treatment as the proximate 
cause of the patient’s death. 
CONCLUSION 
It is not uncommon for patients in the latter stages of a terminal illness 
to request that life-sustaining treatment be withheld or withdrawn when they 
believe that the burden of additional treatment will outweigh the benefit of 
an extended life. Patients at the end of life may also simultaneously ask to 
be sedated to unconsciousness as a palliative measure to relieve the suffering 
that is likely to attend the termination of their treatments. Although the 
Natural Death Act addresses the rights of patients who seek to withhold or 
withdraw treatment and the corresponding obligations of their physicians to 
comply with patients’ directives, it does not directly speak to those rights 
and obligations with respect to active palliative interventions such as 
sedation to unconsciousness. Yet, the natural interrelationship that exists 
between the provision of palliative care and the withholding or withdrawal 
of life-sustaining treatment suggests that the Act offers a meaningful 
reference point for informing that inquiry. 
The Act is relevant because sedation to unconsciousness is a logical 
and sometimes necessary extension of one’s right to refuse the sort of life-
sustaining treatment with which the statute is primarily concerned. The 
Act also incorporates the legal and ethical distinction between affirmative 
interventions intended to accelerate the moment of death—such as 
physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia—and merely passive decisions 
to withhold or withdraw methods of treatment that would only prolong the 
dying process.  
The Act strikes a delicate but uncertain balance when seeking to define 
an individual’s rights with respect to these passive and active interventions. 
The statute clearly reflects the concept that one’s right to refuse life-
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sustaining treatment does not rest on an abstract notion of individual 
autonomy that is so broad as to encompass an active intervention designed 
to bring about his death. By its own terms, the law expressly disavows 
affirmative interventions such as euthanasia and assisted suicide. At the 
same time, however, the Act acknowledges implicitly the practical difficulty 
of characterizing as a crime any circumstance in which death results from 
the passive refusal of treatment, simply because the facts of each case tend 
to be both unique and complex. Rather, these cases are marked by subtle 
differences and subjective questions of causation and intent that effectively 
preclude the law from universally condemning the practice of sedation to 
unconsciousness, even when the sedative is combined with a patient’s 
decision to withhold treatment in the form of artificial nutrition and 
hydration. 
Although the Act is sometimes ambiguous when applied in the context 
of these interventions, that ambiguity is not surprising, particularly in light 
of the challenging practical and ethical issues that accompany the 
provision of palliative care at the end of life. Nor is the present 
ambivalence necessarily troubling, because it allows the sort of reflection 
necessary to fully consider the implications life-terminating interventions 
pose before they are implemented. At the same time, it gives health care 
providers sufficient leeway to carefully measure the bounds of their 
obligations from an ethical perspective and exercise professional 
discretion in individual cases within those limits. 
 
